For a number of years, we have advised many of our clients to consider using large numbers and when possible, directional lettering (i.e. 1W for a front exterior door facing the West).  This can help emergency responders arrive faster at the location at a school where they are needed when seconds count.  This approach can also be helpful for daily wayfinding, helping visitors locate the appropriate door during a special event, or even for improving communications for maintenance requests.  Our preference is for schools to place these numbers above the door on the exterior for outside way finding and low on the interior to help occupants evacuate in the event of a fire.

There are, however, times when external numbering could prove to be helpful to an aggressor.  For example, during an assessment project for an independent school overseas, we advised a client not to utilize exterior door numbering.  The school is at unusually high risk for terrorist attacks and is surrounded by a high privacy wall to make it harder for terrorists to conduct surveillance of the school.  The campus is rather large with many buildings and can be difficult for someone who is not familiar with the layout to navigate.  Due to unreliable law enforcement response in the region, we felt the benefits of this type of numbering were outweighed by the risks of terrorists being able to more rapidly locate victims in an attack on the campus.  Trusted armed security personnel who would respond to an attack can utilize printed virtual tours and their familiarity with the campus for emergency wayfinding.

In the U.S., a far more common hazard involves situations where classroom and office numbers are placed on outside windows.  This could allow someone coming to a school to attack or attempting to abduct a specific person to more easily locate a particular victim or group of victims.  We suggest school and public safety officials weigh the advantages and disadvantages of this approach before marking individual rooms on the outside of the building.   

Though the specific remedies recommended may vary, a number of people have suggested that school lockdowns are a failed concept that should be replaced.  The solutions offered typically center around options focused heavily on teaching people to attack an active shooter as a last resort.  There has been considerable controversy about these options with no real consensus among school safety experts, law enforcement officials, or educators regarding these approaches. 

We feel that while it is important to discuss, consider, and most importantly, to properly test these approaches, it is even more important that we carefully evaluate the idea that lockdown is a failed concept.  Much of the discussion surrounding this assertion has relied heavily on emotional language with statements that are questionable at best.  For example, we have seen repeated references to fatality rates for occupants of individual rooms which do not accurately reflect overall survival rates for the facilities where shootings have occurred.

We have also seen repeated references to lockdown failure that do not match the facts of shootings that are cited as examples of “proof” that lockdown does not work.  For example, we have seen repeated examples citing deaths in classrooms that did not have locks on the door, where staff had not been issued keys, where no lockdown training has been provided, or where no lockdown drills had been conducted.  Using such questionable rationale as “proof” that lockdown is a failed concept should raise red flags.  If you have a solid basis for an assertion, you should not have to stretch to make a convincing argument.

I have repeatedly seen references to the Red Lake Reservation school shooting as “proof” that lockdown is a failed concept.  Having worked that case as an expert witness, I can firmly state that this is not a factually accurate assessment.  Neither I nor the other school security expert who evaluated that case reached that conclusion.  In addition, there was never an allegation of this in any of the many civil actions filed in this case.  Another case that has been used as an example involves the hostage situation in Bailey, Colorado.  One popular active shooter program includes statements that indicate the hostages remained passive and compliant and indicates that the students should have attacked the hostage-taker.  In this case, one student was shot and killed when a police tactical team made a dynamic entry in an effort to neutralize the aggressor because it was apparent that he was going to shoot hostages.  Suggesting that the teacher and students should have attacked the hostage-taker in this example is in contrast to the approach recommended by leading experts in hostage situations.

Some who make these arguments also incorrectly and repeatedly put forth the notion that all traditional lockdown approaches teach people to passively await execution should an active shooter breach a locked classroom door.  Many school districts have been teaching staff to deviate from their emergency plans for more than two decades.  We have long referred to this concept as “Permission to Live.”  Contrary to common assertions, there are ways to prepare staff to adapt to extremely rare and unusual situations like an active shooter breaching a locked classroom door without focusing the majority of instructional time on specific techniques used to subdue an aggressor.  It is important to note that thus far, not one of the students or school employees who have successfully subdued an active shooter has been a graduate of any of the training programs which teach people to attack an active shooter.   We also feel it is critical to remind people that while some active shooters have been stopped by students and staff who attacked an active shooter, a number of school employees have been shot and killed unsuccessfully attempting to disarm people with guns in schools.

While we agree that new and improved concepts can and should be developed, we feel it is critical that theoretical high-stakes changes this controversial, should be carefully tested and validated before thousands of people are trained in their use.  If the concepts are valid, they will withstand independent evaluation.   If assertions used to sell such concepts are accurate, verifiable statements should be used to convince people who are reluctant to embrace and implement them.

Police Chief Rus Drew from the Columbus State University Police Department in Columbus, Georgia confirmed that a suspect had been shot and killed by Columbus State Police.  Chief Drew told reporters that the man was shot and killed after a foot chase.  According to reports, Columbus State Police responded to a report of a man with a gun and the man fled when officers arrived.  Initial reports indicate the man may have pointed a gun at officers before he was shot.  The Georgia Bureau of Investigation is conducting an independent investigation of the incident as is a common practice for officer involved shootings in Georgia.